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In this paper we examine whether the cultural origin of firm managers affects the financing 
decisions of the firms they run. The notion that the cultural background of individuals can affect 
their own financial decisions is well established in the economics literature (see, for example, 
Guiso et al., 2004). At the same time, an influential body of literature dating back at least to 
Bertrand and Schoar (2003) has documented that individual characteristics of managers represent 
significant determinants of firm policies. Following the predictions of the managerial-style 
literature, we ask to what extent the financial preferences of managers––as shaped by their 
cultural origin––carry through into firm financial policies.  
The empirical identification of the effect of management’s cultural traits on firm financing 
decisions is challenging, because firms led by CEOs who belong to different cultural groups are 
usually headquartered in different countries. Being able to distinguish the role played by the 
cultural background of the manager from the role played by other country-specific factors is 
crucial, as differences in economic conditions (i.e., interest rates, inflation, or expectations about 
the business cycle), incentives provided by institutions and regulation (i.e., tax incentives), and 
geographic considerations (such as proximity to financial institutions) have been shown to affect 
financing choices. We overcome this empirical challenge by exploiting cultural differences in a 
sample of firms within a geographical area that shares a common regulatory, institutional, and 
macroeconomic setting: The autonomous province of South Tyrol in Northern Italy.  
The South Tyrol province represents an excellent natural laboratory to assess whether differences 
in the cultural origin of firm managers affect firm financing choices. One of the richest areas in 
the European Union, South Tyrol is home to individuals who belong to two main cultural groups: 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2979247 
3 
 
Italian and Germanic.1 Both Italian and German are official languages and the two cultural 
groups share a common Catholic religious background and live next to each other within 
municipalities. However, they lead relatively segregated social lives: Children attend separate 
schools and individuals of Germanic (Italian) origin interact and socialize mostly with Germanic 
(Italian) peers. Importantly for our study, the province includes a large number of firms from a 
wide range of industry sectors, all subject to the same institutional, regulatory, and legal 
framework. Thus, taxation and subsidization of the different financial instruments are equal for 
all firms in the province. Due to its uniqueness, the South Tyrol setting has been used in previous 
studies to investigate the influence of culture on several economic outcomes (see Angerer et al., 
2016 and Sutter et al., 2018). While this empirical laboratory is highly specific, our results are of 
general interest, as one quarter of all jurisdictions in the world operate in more than one language 
(Leung, 2016). Notable examples include Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, and the European 
Union as a whole. 
Exploring cultural differences across firm managers in South Tyrol is particularly well suited to 
address our research question because the two cultural groups differ significantly along several 
dimensions that can affect financing choices. To start with, we note that, in contrast to its Italian 
translation, the German word for debt, Schuld, is morally charged (meaning fault or guilt). In 
addition, German and Italian languages differ in their degree of future-time reference, an aspect 
that has been linked to financial behavior (Chen, 2013). Individuals from the two cultural groups 
also differ in their levels of social capital and trust, which have been associated with financial 
development and the recourse to informal sources of debt (Guiso et al., 2004; Levine et al., 
2018). 
                                                          
1 With “Germanic culture” we refer to people who speak German or a regional version of standard German. 
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Following Guiso et al. (2006), we define culture as “those customary beliefs and values that 
ethnic, religious, and social groups transmit fairly unchanged from generation to generation”. 
Throughout our analysis we proxy the cultural origin of firm managers with their names, under 
the assumption that managers with a Germanic (Italian) name share a common language. 
Consistently with the above definition, our premise is that speaking the same language is a 
necessary condition for social interaction and for spreading cultural values. Through a common 
language, parents transmit their beliefs and preferences vertically to their children and, similarly, 
peers transmit their values horizontally to other peers. Accordingly, we classify all managers of 
firms headquartered in South Tyrol as of Germanic or Italian origin based on their given names 
and surnames. Our approach is similar to the one in Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), who use a 
classification based on names to achieve intra-country cultural identification across two distinct 
language families. 
In line with our predictions, we find significant differences with respect to financing decisions 
between firms managed by individuals of different cultural backgrounds. In particular, we find 
that firms run by managers from the Italian cultural group resort more to external debt financing 
than firms run by individuals from the Germanic group in the form of both bank debt and trade 
credit.  
By construction, our setup allows us to minimize the possibility that the results are due to 
differences in institutional or macroeconomic conditions. In a series of robustness tests, we show 
that our results are not explained away by financial constraints and availability of bank and trade 
credit to firms of different cultural groups (both in normal times and during the financial and 
sovereign crisis), or by an endogenous sorting of managers of different cultural origin with 
certain firm characteristics. In fact, they continue to hold (i) within the sample of family firms 
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that are managed by a family member; (ii) within the subsample of micro firms; (iii) by 
excluding the industry sectors that have a high concentration of CEOs from a single cultural 
group; (iv) by excluding the firms that import the most and, hence, may differ in the terms of 
trade credit; (v) in culturally homogeneous cities; (vi) in the more culturally heterogeneous city 
of Bolzano. Our findings consistently show that firms managed by an individual of Italian origin 
are more likely to resort to external borrowings, and they rely more intensively on both formal 
and informal sources of financing. We conclude that managers from seemingly close cultures 
that live side-by-side can nevertheless display large and important differences in basic corporate 
finance decisions. 
Our paper contributes primarily to the literature that analyzes the impact of culture on firm 
policies. Existing studies associate culture with corporate risk taking (Li et al., 2015), corporate 
governance (Griffin et al., 2017), firm performance (Frijns et al., 2016), and cash holdings (Chen 
et al., 2017). The papers most closely related to ours are those linking culture and firm financing 
(Chui et al., 2002; Li et al., 2011; El Ghoul and Zheng, 2016; Levine et al., 2018). Our 
contribution to the literature is threefold. First, these studies rely mainly on cross-country 
differences to investigate the relation between culture and firm financing and, as such, may be 
unable to fully control for differences in regulatory, institutional, and economic settings (Karolyi, 
2016). In contrast, our method follows an alternative strand of the literature that relies on the 
epidemiological approach, which attempts to separate culture from the environment by studying 
outcome variables of individuals whose cultures differ, but who share a common economic and 
institutional setting (Fernández, 2011). In this respect, our empirical design specifically 
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addresses potential omitted variable biases linked to cross-country differences in institutional and 
regulatory structures, contract enforcement, and business practices.2 
Second, while most related studies investigate publicly traded corporations, our sample firms are 
all privately held and mostly owner-managed. This feature brings three clear advantages: (i) 
Owner-managed firms are not prone to principal-agent problems; (ii) the cultural traits of 
managers are more likely to manifest themselves through firm financing policies; (iii) the risk of 
endogeneous sorting of managers from a given cultural group into firms with specific financing 
policies is minimized. 
Third, our approach enables us to uncover new channels through which culture potentially 
affects the financing structure. As we will show, Schwartz’s and Hofstede’s cultural scores, 
which have been largely employed to establish the link between culture and firm financing (Chui 
et al., 2002; Li et al., 2011; El Ghoul and Zheng, 2016) are unlikely to be sufficiently different 
between the two cultural groups to explain our findings. Similarly, our results do not seem to be 
driven by linguistic differences in future-time reference, as in Chen (2013). Instead, we provide 
suggestive evidence that our findings are most likely to be explained by differences in the level 
of social capital and by broader cultural preferences for particular financing sources. 
Our findings also make a more general contribution to the trade credit literature, by providing an 
additional explanation to the recourse to this type of financing in the presence of specialized 
financial intermediaries (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Giannetti et al., 2011). The theoretical 
literature has mostly focused on transaction costs or information asymmetries to justify the co-
existence of formal bank credit and informal trade credit. We suggest an additional explanation: 
                                                          
2 Delis et al. (2017), Pan et al. (2017), and Nguyen et al. (2018) use this approach to assess the impact of culture on 
corporate performance and risk-taking. 
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The higher recourse to trade credit could simply reflect personal, culturally founded, preferences 
towards this informal source of financing. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional background, Section 3 
outlines the research design, Section 4 presents the main empirical findings, Section 5 contains 
robustness checks, and Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Institutional Background  
In 1915, the Triple Entente––United Kingdom, France, and Russia––signed a treaty with Italy, 
which stipulated that Italy should abandon its alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary (the 
Triple Alliance) and instead join the war on the side of the Entente. In return, Italy was promised 
a number of territorial gains following the ultimate defeat of the German and Austro-Hungarian 
Empires. Subsequently, in 1919, Austria ceded South Tyrol to Italy with the Treaty of Saint-
Germain-en-Laye, thereby ending hundreds of years of Habsburg rule in the province. 
At the time of its annexation, 89% of the population spoke German, 3% spoke Italian, and the 
remainder of the population spoke either Ladin or other languages of the Empire (Benvenuto, 
2007). This was however to quickly change. In 1923, the fascist government initiated the 
“Italianization” of South Tyrol, which included a series of measures and economic incentives 
aimed at favoring the relocation of Italians from other parts of Italy to South Tyrol. During this 
period, the majority of German schools were closed and Italian was declared the only official 
language of the province.  
Following the Second World War, the region of Trentino-Alto Adige (which includes the 
provinces of Trentino and South Tyrol) was granted a special autonomous status, German and 
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Italian were both recognized as official languages, incentives in favor of Italians were formally 
removed, and German-language education was re-introduced. However, since Italians were still 
the majority at the regional level, self-government of the Germanic minority was not possible 
until 1972, when the province of South Tyrol was explicitly granted an autonomous status. The 
1972 agreement guarantees equal rights and opportunities to South Tyroleans of both language 
groups, and grants considerable legislative and executive independence from the national 
government in most matters of economic and social affairs. Importantly for our study, all firms 
headquartered in South Tyrol are subject to autonomous regulations that are set at the province 
level, and the chamber of commerce of the province is in charge of their enforcement. Thus, all 
firms in our study share the same legal and regulatory framework. In particular, any interest on 
debt financing is tax deductible for all firms in the province, and eventual subsidies are equal 
across firms within industrial sectors.  
As of the last census in year 2011 (ASTAT, 2015), 70% out of roughly half a million inhabitants 
in South Tyrol reported German as their mother tongue, 26% reported Italian as their main 
language, and 4% identified themselves as Ladin speakers. The map in Figure 1 illustrates the 
distribution of Italian speakers in South Tyrol. The majority of the municipalities in South Tyrol 
are predominantly German speaking, although there is variation across towns: For example, 73% 
of the population in the capital city of Bolzano is Italian-speaking compared to 0% of the 
population of Martello, a town in the northwestern Vinschgau region that borders Austria and 
Switzerland. As a consequence of the “Italianization” process, the largest concentration of Italian 
speakers is located in the valleys close to the cities of Bolzano and Merano. Although 
municipalities differ considerably on the proportion of Italian-speaking population, there is no 
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geographic segregation between citizens within municipalities, and the vast majority of the 
population (96.1%) shares a common Roman Catholic religion.    
 
3. Research Design 
Our research design follows the epidemiological method (described extensively in Fernández, 
2011), which aims to separate culture from the environment by studying the outcomes of 
individuals from different cultures who share a common economic and institutional setting. This 
approach presents obvious advantages in controlling for omitted variables and endogeneity 
compared to more standard methods such as the use of cross-country regressions. The 
epidemiological method is well suited for our purposes since South Tyroleans are all exposed to 
an identical economic and institutional environment and differ only in terms of belonging either 
to the Germanic or Italian culture. In order to assess the impact of managers’ cultural origin on 
firm financing––and at the same time prevent cultural explanations from becoming simple ex-
post rationalizations and reduce the risk of spurious correlations––we follow a three-step 
procedure described as follows.  
3.1 Step one: Hypothesis development 
Our first step is to argue that individuals in South Tyrol of Germanic culture on one hand, and of 
Italian culture on the other hand, differ in a number of characteristics that can affect their 
financing decisions. This link can be deduced from several studies, empirical observations, and 
anecdotal evidence. 
From a purely linguistic perspective, we note that the German word for debt is Schuld, which can 
be translated into English as fault or guilt. This morally charged term contrasts with the more 
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neutral Italian word for debt, debito, stemming from the Latin word debere, which simply means 
to owe something. Consistently with an overall negative view of debt, there is anecdotal 
evidence that borrowing for consumption purposes is often frowned upon in German-speaking 
countries. Thus, it is natural to assume that Italian-speaking individuals would favor a financing 
structure that relies relatively more on debt than German-speaking individuals do. 
Further, we can advance some hypothesis regarding the sources of external financing that Italian-
speaking borrowers are more likely to tap. A number of studies have documented that Italians are 
more likely to rely on informal networks and institutions. Bandiera et al. (2010) find that Italian 
managers are more likely to be hired through informal channels such as personal or family 
contacts, rather than through formal channels like business contacts or headhunters. Puntscher et 
al. (2014) document that individuals of Italian origin living in South Tyrol are more likely to 
establish informal friendship ties and less likely to organize themselves and interact through 
formal associations compared to South Tyroleans of Germanic origin. Along these lines, we 
expect individuals of Italian origin to rely more often than individuals of Germanic origin on 
informal sources of financing. 
Guiso et al. (2004) directly link the reliance on informal financing to the level of social capital. 
Since social capital is an important determinant of the level of trust, and trust is a necessary 
condition for the development of financial markets, social capital should affect the level of 
financial development. By exploiting social capital differences at the province level in Italy 
(measured as participation in referenda and blood donations), they show that households located 
in low social-capital areas make more use of informal credit. Data on households’ recourse to 
bank and informal financing are not available at intra-province level, making it difficult to 
directly test whether South Tyroleans of Italian and Germanic origin differ in their financing 
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habits. However, a number of elements suggest that individuals of Italian cultural origin may be 
characterized by lower levels of social capital and trust. Becker et al. (2016) find that populations 
that were affiliated to the Habsburg Empire in the past, like the German-speaking inhabitants of 
South Tyrol, still preserve higher levels of trust in formal institutions today. Puntscher et al. 
(2014) conduct a survey in the South Tyrol province and report lower levels of generalized trust 
in Italian-speaking citizens.3 Similar to Guiso et al. (2004), in an untabulated analysis we explore 
the participation in referenda and find a positive correlation of 45.5% between the proportion of 
German-speaking population in the municipalities in South Tyrol according to the 2011 census 
and the participation to the referendum that took place in the same year. Following this 
argument, we would expect informal sources of debt to represent a significant component of 
external financing for South Tyroleans from the Italian cultural group. 
Finally, the literature on managerial style predicts that managers’ individual traits and 
preferences (including those arising from culture) are likely to affect the decisions they make 
concerning not only their household, but also their firms. Thus, based on the above arguments, 
we derive our main hypotheses: (i) Firm managers from the Italian cultural group are more likely 
to resort to debt financing relative to firm managers of the Germanic cultural group, (ii) 
managers from the Italian cultural group are more likely to resort to informal forms of debt, such 
as trade credit, compared to managers from the Germanic cultural group. 
                                                          
3 Our own calculations using data from the European Value Survey (2008-2010) show that Italians have 
significantly lower trust than Austrians (at a 1% significance level). Culturally, Austrians and Italians are the closest 
to the two groups present in South Tyrol. The generalized level of trust is measured with the percentage of 
respondents answering positively to the question “Most people can be trusted”. See 
http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/. 
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3.2 Step two: Classification of the manager’s cultural origin  
The second step consists of classifying firm managers into their cultural group. We start by 
selecting firms headquartered in the South Tyrol province with data available on Orbis-Bureau 
van Dijk. Given that Italian law requires such companies to file and deposit annual reports with 
the local Chamber of Commerce, this set of firms includes essentially all the limited liability 
firms (Societa’ per Azioni and Societa’ a Responsabilita’ Limitata) headquartered in the 
province. Through the NACE industry classification code, we exclude utilities, financial, and 
real estate companies, due to their regulated status and peculiar capital and debt structure. For the 
remaining sample firms, we retrieve the latest available data on the board composition (as of 
March 2016), and identify the CEO.  
To establish whether the CEO is of Germanic or Italian cultural origin we proceed as follows. 
We utilize search algorithms that identify the most common: Germanic surnames; Germanic 
male given names; Germanic female given names; Italian surnames; Italian male given names; 
Italian female given names.4 Subsequently, a CEO is classified as having a Germanic cultural 
origin if all his/her given names and surname can be found in the Germanic listings, while he/she 
is classified as having an Italian cultural origin if given names and surname are in the Italian 
lists. We require that both the given name and the surname are Germanic (Italian) for a CEO to 
be associated with a Germanic (Italian) origin. We manually double-check the allocation of 
                                                          
4 We retrieve Italian surnames from http://www.cognomix.it/origine-cognomi-italiani, which lists the most common 
Italian surnames explaining their origin. We obtain German and Austrian surnames, respectively, from 
https://de.wiktionary.org/wiki/Verzeichnis:Deutsch/Liste_der_h%C3%A4ufigsten_Nachnamen_Deutschlands and 
https://de.wiktionary.org/wiki/Verzeichnis:Deutsch/Liste_der_h%C3%A4ufigsten_Nachnamen_%C3%96sterreichs, which are 
based on telephone directories of the countries and were manually cleaned to eliminate foreign last names. Finally, 
first names come from http://www.vornamen-weltweit.de/maennlich-deutsch.php, http://www.vornamen-weltweit.de/weiblich-
deutsch.php, and http://www.vornamen-weltweit.de/geographisch.php?land=4. 
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CEOs to the two categories to ensure that such requirement is satisfied. In comparison to 
alternative classification criteria based only on the first name or on the surname, our approach 
enables us to achieve a neater identification of the origin of managers and reduce potential 
misclassification bias due, for example, to bilingual families. Bilingual families may lead to 
misclassification to the extent that managers whose parents speak different languages cannot be 
easily associated with one of the two cultures. Given that bilingual families are most likely to 
manifest themselves through mixed names (e.g., a Germanic first name and an Italian surname), 
constraining both the name and the surname of the manager to be of the same linguistic origin 
should minimize such instances. Our classification criterion is not overly restrictive, as only 
5.8% of the firm managers in the province have a discordant Germanic (Italian) first name and 
Italian (Germanic) surname.5 Since we are interested in comparing the features of firms run by 
managers of Germanic and Italian origins, we discard managers with a different linguistic origin, 
which account for 2.1% of the firms in the province. Some examples of how we have classified 
managers are provided in Appendix A. 
3.3 Step three: Impact of the manager’s culture on firm financing 
The third and final step of our research approach is to show that the cultural background of the 
manager has an impact on the firm’s choices of financing channels. We do so by regressing a 
number of firm financing outcome variables on the manager’s cultural origin indicator obtained 
above.  
                                                          
5 For robustness, we repeat our analysis by classifying the linguistic origin of CEOs on the basis of (i) their first 
name only, and (ii) their surname only. The results, available from the authors upon request, are qualitatively 
unchanged. 
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Our regression analysis exploits the cross-sectional variation in managers’ culture and firm 
financing structure. We obtain information about the financing structure from Orbis. This 
database provides only the latest available information on the composition and characteristics of 
the top management of a firm. For consistency, in our main analyses we extract the latest 
financial statements available (as of March 2016) for our sample firms. This ensures that the firm 
financial variables we look at refer to a time when the manager was in charge of the company.6  
Table 1 reports basic summary statistics on the cross section of our sample firms. Our key 
variable is the indicator variable CEO of Italian origin, which takes a value of one if the manager 
is classified as of Italian origin and zero if he/she is classified as of Germanic origin. On average, 
31.1% of the managers in the sample are of Italian origin. This is in line with the overall 
percentage of Italian-speaking population in South Tyrol, which was equal to 26.1% according to 
the 2011 Census (ASTAT, 2015). We map the distribution of firms with a CEO of Italian origin 
by city in Figure 2. We note by comparing Figure 2 to Figure 1 that the cities with the largest 
proportion of CEOs of Italian origin are mostly, but not always, the cities where the population is 
predominantly Italian speaking.  
In terms of other firm characteristics, none of the firms in the sample is publicly traded and only 
2.3% are large firms according to the definitions provided by the European Commission (i.e. 
turnover larger than 50 million euros or total assets larger than 43 million euros). The financing 
structure of our firms is therefore very simplified and consists essentially of equity, bank loans 
and trade credit. To analyze the financing structure of firms we use the following ratios: External 
debt financing over total assets––constructed as the sum of loans, long term debt and accounts 
                                                          
6 As we shall see below, all of the firms in the sample are privately held and most of them are small or micro firms. 
As a result, the cultural origin of the management of the company is unlikely to change over a relatively small time 
horizon. For robustness, in Section 5.2 we also exploit the panel dimension of the Orbis data. 
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payable over total assets––which measures the total actual borrowings of the firms; Total debt 
over total assets, as a measure of recourse to formal financing (i.e. bank loans); Accounts 
payable over total assets as a measure of recourse to informal financing (i.e. trade credit). These 
will be the main dependent variables in our analysis, together with three indicator variables for 
the use of external debt, bank debt, or trade credit. To complement our analysis, we also include 
two variables to analyze the asset structure of the firms’ balance sheet: Cash over total assets, 
and accounts receivable over total assets, as a measure of how much credit a firm provides to its 
clients. 
In Table 2, we compare the balance sheet structure of firms led by managers of Italian and 
Germanic origins by means of a standard two-sample t-test for differences in means. Our 
findings suggest that firms run by managers of Italian culture are more likely to resort to external 
debt than firms run by managers of Germanic culture: With the exception of the ratio of total 
debt to assets, which is statistically indistinguishable between the two groups, the debt indicators 
and debt levels are significantly larger for the firms run by managers of Italian origin. These 
firms are also characterized by a larger recourse to more informal sources of funding, such as 
trade credit (and debit). The two sets of companies also differ along other dimensions. Compared 
to their Germanic-led counterparties, firms with a manager of Italian origin are smaller and 
younger, hold more cash, have a lower share of tangible assets, operate on smaller average 
margins, and are led by managers who are older and more likely to be female. 
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4. Main Results 
4.1 Multivariate findings 
In the remainder of the paper, we shift our analysis to a multivariate setting. Table 3 reports the 
estimates from OLS regressions where the dependent variables measure the firms’ liability and 
asset structure. In all specifications, we add a set of standard control variables that previous 
literature has found to be significant determinants of firm capital structure. Firm-specific controls 
include size, asset tangibility, sales growth, investment, operating margin, and age. We also add 
some manager-specific variables to account for CEO characteristics, other than the linguistic 
origin, that may affect capital and debt structure choices, i.e. age, age squared, and an indicator 
variable that takes a value of one if the manager is male and zero if female. Details on how 
dependent and control variables are calculated are in Appendix B. All continuous variables in 
our analyses are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to minimize the impact of outliers. In 
addition, we use beginning-of-the-year values for our balance sheet control variables to mitigate 
endogeneity concerns. Although our sample is cross-sectional, we add fiscal year-end fixed 
effects to account for the fact that the latest year of available balance sheet data is not the same 
for all sample firms. We employ industry fixed effects, computed according to the 21 NACE 
classification groups, to capture industry-specific differences in the firm financing structure. 
Finally, we add city fixed effects, i.e. one dummy variable for each of the 116 municipalities in 
the province. These fixed effects enable us to control for any variation in institutional, 
geographical and economic characteristics across municipalities with majorities of German-
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speaking or Italian-speaking population (and managers) that may potentially confound our 
results. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity.7 
The results in Table 3 confirm that firms run by managers of Italian cultural origin are more 
likely to resort to external debt financing, and borrow significantly more, than firms run by 
individuals of Germanic cultural origin. Results in the first, third, and sixth columns show that, 
once controlling for standard determinants of firm financing, the former are 5.5 to 10.7 percent 
more likely to use external debt, bank debt, and trade credit, than the latter. Consistently, we also 
find that the former also hold more debt than the latter: External debt financing (total debt) over 
total assets is on average 3.3 (1.9) percentage points higher for Italian-led firms, explaining 
10.5% (8.2%) of its total standard deviation. Managers of Italian origin also display a higher use 
of informal sources of financing: The ratio of trade credit is on average 1.5 percentage points 
higher for firms where the manager is of Italian origin, explaining 7.5% of its total standard 
deviation. In what follows, we advance an explanation for which channels are most likely to be 
driving our results.8 
4.2 Explanatory channels 
The lower recourse to external debt funding observed in firms run by Germanic managers is 
consistent with the preference for avoiding debt that can be associated with the morally charged 
                                                          
7 Results remain qualitatively unchanged if we cluster the standard errors by city. 
8 We also repeat the estimations using the cultural origin of the Board of Directors, i.e. a dummy equal to one (zero) 
when the majority of the members of the board have an Italian (Germanic) origin, in lieu of the cultural origin of the 
CEO. The estimates, reported in Appendix C, are very similar to the ones in Table 3. In order to single out the 
cultural impact of the CEO from that of the board, one should look at instances where the cultural origin of the CEO 
differs from that of the board. This is however unfeasible in our sample of small and privately held firms, as in 
99.7% (99.9%) of cases a firm with a board of Italian (Germanic) origin is led by a CEO from the same cultural 
group. 
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reference to debt (Schuld) in the German language. Consistently with this interpretation, in 
untabulated results we find that (i) the higher recourse to debt by Italian firms is mostly driven 
by the extensive margin, i.e., the decision to borrow from external sources, rather than by the 
amount of debt taken conditional on borrowing, and (ii) firms with Italian-speaking managers are 
significantly less likely to keep retained earnings. Additionally, our findings on the more intense 
use of trade credit from managers of the Italian cultural group can be explained with their lower 
level of trust/social capital and their preference for interacting within informal organizations. As 
discussed in Section 3, individuals of Italian cultural origin are associated with a lower level of 
generalized trust and a stronger preference for informal networks, which are both consistent with 
a more intense use of informal financing sources for managers from this group. 
An alternative explanation of our results, that is also consistent with the lower levels of trust in 
institutions of individuals of Italian origin, is that CEOs from this cultural group rely more 
intensively on debt financing to reduce their cash transfers to the government. As mentioned 
before, interest on debt is tax deductible for all firms in the province. However, this fails to 
explain why firms with Italian-speaking managers would also resort more to trade credit, which 
does not include an explicit interest rate and hence cannot be used for tax deductibility purposes. 
Similarly, our results cannot be convincingly explained by referring to standard classifications of 
cultural dimensions. Schwartz’s and Hofstede’s cultural measures have been widely used to 
explain cross-country differences in capital structure and trade credit. Specifically, Chui et al 
(2002) and Li et al. (2011) link capital structure to the Schwartz’s indicators of embeddedness 
and mastery, while El Ghoul and Zheng (2016) link the use of trade credit to Hofstede’s 
measures of collectivism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance and masculinity. While 
Schwartz’s and Hofstede’s scores for the population of South Tyrol are unavailable, the scores 
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for Austria and Italy, which are the closest countries to our Germanic and Italian cultural groups, 
are fairly similar and fall within the same quartile in the distribution of all indicators except 
power distance.9 Hence, it is unlikely that these score differences per se are sufficient to explain 
our results.  
Newly proposed cultural metrics based on linguistic differences in future-time reference are 
equally unlikely to fully explain our results. Chen (2013) finds that individuals who speak a 
language in which future actions are typically expressed in present tense (i.e. weak future-time 
reference languages, such as German) display a stronger future-oriented behavior (in terms of 
savings, having a retirement account, exercising, or not smoking) than individuals who speak a 
language with a strong future-time reference (such as Italian). Chen et al. (2017) extend the 
argument to firm policies and find higher cash holdings in weak future-time reference language 
firms. Within our setting, the future-time reference argument should translate into higher cash 
ratios in firms run by managers of Germanic origin compared to those run by managers of Italian 
origin. The estimates reported in the fifth column of Table 3 show instead that the difference in 
cash holdings across firms run by managers of different cultural background is economically 
unimportant and statistically insignificant. For this reason, we exclude cash holdings as a 
dependent variable in the rest of the analysis. 
In order to interpret our results in terms of choice/preference of the top management for different 
forms of financing, we need to ensure that the estimated coefficients are not capturing a spurious 
correlation between the cultural origin of the manager and other unobserved factors. In the 
remainder of the paper, we discuss and rule out several competing explanations. 
                                                          
9 Authors’ calculations (available upon request) based on Schwartz’s and Hofstede’s country indicators retrieved 
from https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Shalom_Schwartz and https://geert-hofstede.com, respectively. 




5.  Robustness Checks 
In this section, we adopt several approaches to address potential endogeneity concerns that may 
bias our analysis, in terms of both reverse causality and omitted variables. Reverse causality or 
self-selection occurs if managers of a given cultural origin choose to work for firms with given 
characteristics. In our setting, this would be the case if managers of Italian (Germanic) origin 
were attracted by companies with higher (lower) recourse to external debt financing. An omitted 
variable bias arises in the presence of additional factors that affect both the financing decisions 
of firms and the cultural origin of managers, such as a lower supply of credit for individuals of 
one cultural group. Given the lack of detailed firm-bank and client-supplier level data, we cannot 
perfectly disentangle the effect of culture from such unobserved factors. We nevertheless attempt 
to overcome this limitation by performing additional analyses that exploit unique institutional 
features of the province under study. 
5.1 Local environment and banking sector 
One alternative interpretation to our findings is that firms led by managers of Italian cultural 
origin find it easier to access external financing compared to firms led by German-speaking 
CEOs. As we will discuss, this seems unlikely in our setting. In fact, we show in Table 2 that 
companies run by German-speaking CEOs are larger, older, more profitable, and have more 
tangible assets. These firm characteristics make them more suitable for lending and, therefore, 
less likely to be rationed (see e.g., Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Petersen and Rajan, 1997; 
Hadlock and Pierce, 2010 among many others). Also, the use of city fixed effects controls for 
local factors that may impact the access to bank financing, such as the local banking market 
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competition (Love and Peria, 2015) and geographical proximity to financial institutions (Degryse 
and Ongena, 2005; Agarwal and Hauswald, 2010). 
City fixed effects also help control for potential differences in the lending standards of banks at 
the local level. For the purposes of corporate lending, the banking market in South Tyrol consists 
of 54 banks, 85% of which are local banks headquartered in the province (one Cassa di 
Risparmio/Sparkasse, one Banca Popolare/Volksbank and 44 Banche di Credito 
Cooperativo/Raiffeisen) and the remaining 15% are Italian banks headquartered elsewhere.10 
Small municipalities are mostly served by local banks while large cities are also served by 
national banks. 
Nevertheless, a residual concern may apply to the interpretation of our findings if the 
segmentation in the banking market is highly correlated with the cultural origin of firm 
managers. Specifically, if lending standards differ across banks, firm managers of a certain 
cultural group may: (i) have to turn to banks with restrictive lending conditions, if these are the 
only ones locally present, or (ii) choose to turn to those banks, even in the presence of other 
banks with more favorable lending standards. Such a choice could be motivated by behavioral 
preferences: Fisman et al. (2017) find that the cultural origin of individual bank managers plays a 
significant role in bank lending in a multicultural environment. In our setting, this would 
translate into German-speaking firm managers borrowing predominantly from banks whose 
managers belong to their own cultural group. If those banks apply stricter lending standards than 
those that lend to Italian-speaking CEOs, it may be hard to disentangle to what extent our 
findings are driven by such differences as opposed to the financing preferences of managers.  
                                                          
10 The market share of corporate lending for local banks in the South Tyrol province is around 50% (Bank of Italy, 
2016). The correlation between the population size of a municipality and the proportion of banks that operate in the 
municipality but are headquartered outside the South Tyrol province is 60%. 
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To identify the cultural origin of bank managers in our sample, we gather the names and 
locations of all 347 bank branches in the South Tyrol province.11 From the banks’ websites and 
press releases, we retrieve the name of the bank managers in charge of corporate loans (bank 
branch manager, corporate loan officer, or corporate area manager) and we classify those 
managers as having an Italian or Germanic cultural origin based on their names, in line with the 
approach followed to classify our CEOs. We show the geographical distribution of bank 
managers according to their cultural origin in Figure 3.  
In the absence of firm-bank level data, we proceed by investigating how our main results 
compare in: (i) environments that are characterized by a predominantly German-speaking 
population or where the bank managers are mostly of Germanic origin, and (ii) the more 
heterogeneous capital city of Bolzano, where population, firm managers and bank managers are 
more evenly distributed across the two cultural groups. A comparison of Figures 1, 2, and 3 
suggests that, while the degree of spatial segmentation of the cultural groups is high, there exists 
some variation that enables us to investigate the behavior of firm managers of Italian origin in 
predominantly German-speaking environments. The estimates are presented in Table 4. The 
regressions in panel A include only those cities where less than 30% of the population is Italian-
speaking, while the regressions in panel B include only those cities where less than 30% of the 
banks have an Italian-speaking manager. We choose a 30% cutoff point: (i) to grant sufficient 
sample size and representativeness of firms of Italian origin in the two subsamples; and (ii) for 
consistency with the analysis presented in panel D for the city of Bolzano, where about 70% of 
the population is Italian-speaking. The 30% threshold excludes 16% (panel A) and 20% (panel 
B) of the cities in our baseline sample. However, the municipalities that are removed are 
                                                          
11 Source: http://www.tuttitalia.it/trentino-alto-adige/provincia-autonoma-di-bolzano/22-banche/ 
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relatively large and are home to a large number of firms, hence the sample size is reduced by 
53% in panel A and 57% in panel B. Although the average fraction of Italian-speaking bank 
managers in panel B is only 7.9%, in Panel C we attempt to stretch the banking segmentation 
further and perform more selective regressions on firms headquartered in municipalities with 
only German-speaking bank managers. Finally, panel D investigates the subsample of firms 
headquartered in the city of Bolzano. An additional advantage of this specification is that we can 
fully control for all location-related features by focusing on a single city, the province’s largest. 
All specifications include industry fixed effects and the same set of control variables as in Table 
3, and panels A to C also control for city fixed effects.  
Results in panels A, B, and D are similar and consistent with the main findings in Table 3: The 
coefficients for the three indicator variables of the use of external debt, bank debt and trade 
credit are large and statistically significant. The continuous variables preserve sign and 
magnitude, but lose statistical significance compared to the overall sample in Table 3, most 
likely due to the small size of the subsamples. In contrast, the findings in panel C do not show 
significant differences in the financing patterns of firms of different cultural origin. However, 
relative to the sample in panel B, in this panel the sample size is further reduced by one third and 
the number of firms of Italian origin by 45%. While we cannot fully exclude the possibility that 
in this overwhelmingly homogeneous subsample the cultural channel is either weaker or works 
differently (for example, in the form of a strong integration to the local culture), we suspect that 
the lack of statistical significance is mostly due to the extremely low within-city variation in the 
cultural origin dummy in this sample. 
Overall, our results from Table 4 confirm that firms led by CEOs of Italian cultural origin are 
more likely to resort to external borrowing than their German-speaking peers both in 
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environments that are largely German-speaking and in environments that are culturally diverse. 
In other words, the cultural origin of the CEO has a significant impact on the financing choices 
of the firms regardless of the prevailing cultural environment of the firm’s location.  
5.2 Financial and sovereign crisis 
Another explanation for the results in Table 3 is that they may be driven by a differential impact 
of the financial and sovereign crisis on firms led by managers of different cultural origins. 
Indeed, we recall from Table 2 that firms led by Italian managers display characteristics that are 
typically observed in constrained firms. Our findings could then be consistent with a scenario in 
which the financially weaker firms run by a manager of Italian cultural origin suffer higher net 
worth losses during the financial crisis (for example due to fire sales or lower profitability), 
resulting in higher post-crisis leverage ratios for these firms.12 In a similar vein, the greater use 
of trade credit could be consistent with Italian-led firms resorting to trade credit to partially 
compensate for the lack of institutional credit during the crisis. Levine et al. (2018) find that 
culture matters in increasing the resilience to systemic banking crises in firms with high liquidity 
needs through trade credit, performance and employment.  
We address this issue by exploiting a unique feature of the firms in our sample, namely, that all 
of them are privately held, and the majority of them are small firms. Thus, the management of 
our sample firms is likely to be stable over a short time horizon. We take advantage of this 
feature to overcome the limitation of the Orbis data on firm managers (which refer to the last 
available balance sheet date), and exploit the panel dimension of the financial statement data, by 
                                                          
12 Higher losses could also result if managers of the Italian cultural group did not react as well as their Germanic 
peers to the challenges imposed by the crisis. Indeed, existing studies have linked the manager’s cultural origin with 
firm performance under competitive pressure (Nguyen et al., 2018).  
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assuming that the cultural origin of the management of our companies is stable throughout the 
sample years. Balance sheet data on the sample firms are available on Orbis for the most recent 
ten years. We re-estimate our baseline OLS specifications on the full 10-year panel dataset of 
firms headquartered in the province, and evaluate whether the results observed in the cross-
sectional dataset stem from the crisis period. For this purpose, we add the interaction between 
our indicator for CEO of Italian origin and a dummy variable Crisis, which takes a value of one 
if the year of the financial statement coincides with the period of credit tightening in the South 
Tyrol province. The statistics on conditions of credit supply provided by the Bank of Italy (2007-
2016) indicate that there was a credit contraction and a tightening in credit conditions in the 
province during years 2008-2013, and that such contraction relaxed from year 2014 onwards.13 
Therefore, we define two dummy variables accordingly: Crisis, which equals one for 2008-2013 
and zero otherwise, and Post Crisis, which equals one for the years 2014-2015 and zero 
otherwise. We interact each of these two dummies with our cultural origin dummy. 
We present the results in Table 5, panels A and B. In panel A, we include industry, city and year 
fixed effects; the latter subsume the effect of the un-interacted Crisis and Post Crisis dummies. 
In panel B, we further control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity at the firm level, by 
including firm fixed effects, which absorb the city fixed effects. The firm fixed effects in panel B 
also subsume the effect of the un-interacted cultural origin dummy, but the interaction term 
provides us with a direct test for a differential behavior of firms led by a manager of Italian 
cultural origin relative to firms led by a manager of Germanic cultural origin during the crisis. In 
                                                          
13 This period contrasts with the crisis period in Italy, which started in 2008 and continued until at least the end of 
our sample period. However, the South Tyrol province developed differently to the rest of Italy. In fact, it is the only 
Italian province that had a higher GDP level in 2015 than in 2007. Our results are qualitatively equal if we define a 
single Crisis dummy taking the value one from 2008 to 2015, coinciding with the crisis in Italy.  
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both panels, we account for the fact that observations of the same firm over time are not 
independent, and cluster the standard errors at the firm level. 
The estimated coefficients for the dummy of Italian cultural origin in panel A of Table 5 largely 
confirm that firms led by managers of Italian origin are characterized by a larger recourse to 
external debt funding in general and informal sources of funding in particular, than firms run by 
managers of Germanic origin. Indeed, the coefficients of the un-interacted cultural origin dummy 
are positive and statistically significant, and have similar magnitudes as the coefficients in Table 
3. These results suggest that the financing patterns of firms managed by a manager of Italian 
cultural origin existed before the crisis, confirming our interpretation of the results as driven by 
preferences rather than by a potentially worse financial situation of Italian-led firms. 
Furthermore, the coefficients of the interaction term with the Crisis dummy in panels A and B 
show that Italian-led firms actually obtained more bank credit during the time of a reduced 
supply for credit, further mitigating concerns that their weaker financial situation during the 
crisis could have led to our previous findings. In fact, the coefficients of the interaction term with 
the crisis for the external debt financing ratio and the debt to assets ratio (second and fourth 
columns in both panels) are positive and significant, suggesting that firms led by a manager of 
Italian cultural origin increased their access to external borrowing and to formal sources of credit 
during the crisis. Consistently with this interpretation, the coefficient of this interaction term for 
the ratio of accounts payable (sixth column) is small and statistically insignificant, suggesting 
that on average, firms led by managers of Italian origin did not use more trade credit during the 
crisis. Finally, the coefficient of the cultural dummy on the regression for accounts receivable in 
Panel B shows that Italian-led firm actually increased the provision of trade credit to their clients 
during the crisis (last column). In line with the redistribution theory of trade credit, this result 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2979247 
27 
 
suggests that firms that have access to formal sources of credit are able to provide liquidity to 
their clients in times when bank credit is scarce (Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga, 
2013), and it provides evidence that Italian firms were investing in the relationships with their 
clients. Once again, this is inconsistent with the idea that results are driven by potentially weaker 
Italian-led firms.14 
5.3 Trade credit supply  
A related concern is that the results in Table 3 are driven by differences in the supply of trade 
credit for firms of different cultural origin. There are several reasons why the supply of trade 
credit could be correlated with the cultural origin of the firm’s manager. First, suppliers could 
display different degree of trust towards firms of different cultural origin (Guiso et al., 2009) and 
hence they might require cash payments or offer trade credit for firms of distinct cultural groups. 
Second, previous literature has found stark differences in the provision of trade credit across 
different countries (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; ECB, 2011; El Ghoul and Zheng, 2016). To the 
extent that a portion of these differences can be explained by culture (El Ghoul and Zheng, 
2016), our findings could be consistent with a scenario in which firms of Italian (Germanic) 
cultural origin buy mostly from firms of the same cultural group, which may differ in their 
                                                          
14 To confirm that our findings are driven by an increase in debt, rather than a reduction in assets of firms with 
Italian-speaking managers, in Appendix D we use panel regressions with firm fixed effects to compare the evolution 
of assets, debt, and employment in firms of different cultural origin during the crisis. The positive and statistically 
significant coefficients of the interaction of culture and the crisis in columns 2 and 3, and the insignificant ones in 
columns 1 and 4 confirm that the larger debt ratios observed for firms of Italian origin are driven by an increase in 
the levels of debt, and not a reduction in their net worth or a lower investment in labour. Further, results in Appendix 
E suggest that those firms invested larger amounts in fixed capital, and performed similarly to firms of Germanic 
origin during the crisis.  Overall, the evidence confirms our interpretation that the larger recourse to debt of Italian-
led firms is driven by preferences rather than by a differential impact of the financial and sovereign crisis on firms 
led by managers of different cultural origins. 
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willingness to provide trade credit.. Third and relatedly, if firms with German-speaking 
managers in the province are more likely than their Italian-speaking peers to import their goods 
from German-speaking countries, then differences in the use of trade credit could reflect 
differences in the payment periods offered across countries. 
We address this issue by controlling for the potential supply of trade credit in a two-step 
estimation strategy similar to the one in Petersen and Rajan (1997). In the first step, we predict 
the amount of credit offered by the firms’ suppliers, accounting for the cultural origin of the 
firms in addition to other standard predictors of trade credit supply. We then use the predicted 
quantity of trade credit supplied to a firm as an additional regressor in the trade credit equations. 
Additionally, in Section 5.4 we deal with the possibility that the results may reflect different 
credit payment terms offered for imported goods. 
We measure the supply of trade credit as the product of the ratio of the firm’s purchases over 
total assets (where the purchases are calculated as the sum of the cost of raw materials and 
services), by the fraction of purchases made on credit. Unlike Petersen and Rajan (1997), we do 
not have survey information providing firm-level measures for the fraction of purchases made on 
credit. However, trade credit policies are largely determined by the nature of the goods sold and 
have limited within-industry variation (Ng et al., 1999; Giannetti et al., 2011). Therefore, we 
calculate this fraction at the industry level, using the (weighted) average of the ratios of accounts 
receivable to sales in the industries from which our sample firms purchase their goods and 
services. To identify these industries, we use the input-output matrix of the South Tyrol 
province, provided by Astat/Istat.15 
                                                          
15 The input-output matrix was obtained from http://dati.istat.it/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=DCCN_SQCT. All 
additional firm-specific variables used in this section are obtained from Aida-Bureau van Dijk. The procedure used 
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As in Petersen and Rajan (1997), we estimate the supply of trade credit as a function of the 
customer’s credit quality (proxied by the firm’s size, age, operating margin, and tangible assets), 
the availability of bank credit (ratio of total debt to total assets), the firm’s relationships with 
suppliers (sales growth), liquidation costs (as measured by the fraction of total inventories that 
corresponds to finished goods), and the CEO’s cultural origin dummy. We then augment the 
regression in Table 3 using the predicted supply of trade credit from the first-stage regression. 
Results are contained in Table 6. The first two columns show coefficient estimates for the trade 
credit user dummy, and the second two columns show estimates for the accounts payable ratio as 
dependent variables.  
The specifications reported in the first and third columns correspond to the reduced-form 
specifications in Table 3, augmented with the predicted amount of trade credit supply obtained 
from the first-stage regressions. In the second and fourth columns, we additionally include a 
control for the fraction of current assets over total assets, which is likely to affect the need for 
financing through trade credit. Throughout the specifications, results show a positive correlation 
between the amount of trade credit supplied to each firm and the use or quantity of trade credit 
demanded. More importantly, our main results are robust to this estimation procedure that 
accounts for the supply of trade credit.  
5.4 Further endogeneity concerns 
In this section we address additional endogeneity issues by replicating the results of Table 3 over 
subsamples of firms where self-selection is unlikely to occur and/or omitted variable concerns 
are minimal. First, we restrict our analysis to the subsample of family firms where the manager is 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
to calculate the fraction of purchases on account using the input-output matrix is available from the authors upon 
request. 
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a family member. Such companies are typically founded and run by the same family over their 
entire life. This minimizes the possibility that managers of a given cultural origin choose to work 
for firms with certain characteristics. We retrieve information on the ownership structure of the 
sample firms from Orbis, and we classify a company as a family firm if one or several related 
individuals hold the majority of the shares. We then restrict our sample to those family firms 
whose manager is a family member, i.e. he/she is one of the majority shareholders or carries the 
surname of the controlling family.16 Around 60% of the original sample firms satisfy the 
restrictions. Around 29% of these firms are led by a family of Italian cultural origin. 
We re-estimate our main specification over the subsample of family firms, and report the 
estimates in panel A of Table 7. For the benefit of space, we only report the coefficients for the 
cultural origin dummy; however, the estimations in this table include all the controls and fixed 
effects of Table 3. The positive and significant coefficients of the CEO of Italian origin dummy 
with respect to the three financing dummy variables External debt user, Bank user and Trade 
credit user confirm that the financing pattern discussed above is a general feature of these firms 
and is not caused by endogeneity. In terms of magnitude, the coefficients are similar to the ones 
in Table 3.  
Second, we look into a potential endogenous matching of cultural origin of the manager and firm 
size. To the extent that firms where the manager is of Germanic origin are, overall, larger and 
better established than their Italian counterparts (see Table 2), our results could be capturing 
different financing policies driven by firm size. While we control for firm size in all our 
                                                          
16 Our method may, in fact, underestimate the number of family firms in the sample as, following Italian law, 
women in South Tyrol retain their maiden name after marriage. This, however, is unlikely to introduce any bias in 
the analysis, as it is expected to affect family firms where the CEO is of either Italian or Germanic origin in the same 
way.  
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specifications, the effect may be non-linear. To overcome this issue, we perform the estimations 
over the more homogeneous subsample of micro firms, defined as firms with total assets up to 2 
million euros. Results over the subsample of micro firms are presented in panel B of Table 7. 
They consistently show that firms where the manager is of Italian origin are more likely to 
borrow and also display higher levels of external borrowing in general and trade credit in 
particular. Once again, the coefficients are of similar magnitude as the ones found in Table 3. 
Third, we address the possibility that our results are driven by an omitted variable, namely, the 
terms of credit granted by the firms’ trading partners. The trade credit literature suggests that the 
terms of credit are largely invariant within an industry, and related to the nature of the traded 
good (Ng et al., 1999; Giannetti et al., 2011). Given that our estimations contain industry fixed 
effects, the coefficients obtained so far are unlikely to be biased due to differences across 
industries in the terms of trade credit. However, as mentioned in Section 5.3, terms of trade differ 
within the euro area (ECB, 2011) and, hence, may be different for imported purchases compared 
to domestic purchases. Given the location of the South Tyrol area on the border with Austria and 
Switzerland, one potential concern is that firms with a manager of Germanic origin may be more 
likely to buy goods from these German-speaking countries, and that the observed differences are 
due to the different credit terms in these countries. Therefore, we need to ensure that our results 
cannot be mechanically explained by different trading patterns between the two cultures. 
Unfortunately, Orbis does not disclose the amount of firms’ imports. Thus, to control for this 
potential bias, we re-run our estimation over a subsample of firms that are less likely to be 
importers, according to the input-output matrix for the South Tyrol province. The matrix 
contains data on the fraction of purchases that represent imports. We derive our subsample by 
eliminating the upper quartile of firms by ratio of imports to total purchases (corresponding to 
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13.1% or more imports). The estimates are shown in Table 7, panel C, and confirm our main 
findings. 
Fourth, we address the possibility that managers of a given cultural group are concentrated in 
certain industry sectors. Figure 4 displays the distribution of the managers’ cultural origin within 
each industry. We see that this distribution closely mirrors that of the overall sample firms (i.e. 
31.1% of Italian-speaking CEOs) in the various industries. For robustness, we re-run our 
estimates excluding the two sectors with the lowest proportion of Italian-speaking CEOs 
(agriculture, forestry and fishing and manufacturing) and the two sectors with the highest 
proportion of Italian-speaking CEOs (education and human health and social work activities). 
We report the results in Panel D of Table 7, and they are once again consistent with our main 
findings. To further ensure that the cultural heterogeneity of the industries is not itself driving the 
results, we replace in Table 8 the industry and city fixed effects with interacted city * industry 
fixed effects (Panel A) and with city * industry * firm size group fixed effects (Panel B). We 
follow the European Commission to define four firm size groups: micro, (small), [medium] and 
{large} firms are those with total assets of up to 2, (10), [43] {above 43} million euros. 
Coefficients in this case compare firms of different cultural origin in the same city and industry 
(and size group), hence having similar financing needs and access to the same set of 
opportunities. The results are qualitatively very similar to the ones in Table 3.17 
                                                          
17 We also perform a matching exercise where we compare the financing choices of Italian-led firms with their 
closest counterfactual led by a manager of Germanic cultural origin in terms of city, firm size group (micro, small, 
medium, large) and industry. We run a regression analysis using the subsets of closest matches and we report the 
results in Appendix F. The estimates are qualitatively very similar to the estimates in Table 3, suggesting that our 
results are not driven by a selection of firms led by a manager of Italian cultural origin into particular industries, size 
groups or cities. 
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5.5 Neighboring provinces 
Finally, in this section we address one concern that may be specific to our geographical 
laboratory. Specifically, the negative shocks that the population of South Tyrol has experienced 
since the annexation (c.f. Section 2) may have translated into a higher risk aversion of the 
German-speaking population that, in turn, may manifest itself as a present-day aversion towards 
high leverage.  
We believe that this is unlikely to be driving our findings for two reasons. First, survey measures 
of risk aversion are higher in Italy than in Austria and Germany (Rieger et al., 2015). Puntscher 
et al. (2014) focus on the South Tyrol province and find that the Italian-speaking population is 
more mistrusting than the German-speaking population. If one is ready to assume that risk 
aversion and mistrust are linked, these findings provide evidence against the German-speaking 
group being more risk averse. Second, the assets-to-equity ratio in small and medium sized firms 
is higher in Italy than in Austria and Germany (ECCBSO, 2014). Ignoring all the caveats 
involved in cross-country comparisons, this suggests that, consistently with our cultural and 
linguistic explanation, CEOs of Italian origin borrow more than CEOs of Germanic origin in 
general and not only within the province of South Tyrol.  
Nevertheless, we further investigate this point by comparing the capital structure of firms 
headquartered in the neighboring provinces of Tyrol in Austria and Trentino in Italy. These areas 
were also part of the Habsburg Empire but, unlike South Tyrol, did not experience any negative 
shocks from its dissolution, and are monolingual. We gather financial data on companies 
headquartered in the Austrian Tyrol and Trentino provinces from Orbis for the latest available 
fiscal year prior to 2016. Since Austrian firms with less than 300 employees are not required to 
file detailed financial information (see Orbis Bureau van Dijk User Manual), we can only 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2979247 
34 
 
compute the shareholder equity ratio, measured as equity over total assets, an inverse measure of 
leverage. Table 9 displays summary statistics for the shareholder equity ratio in the provinces of 
Austrian Tyrol, South Tyrol and Trentino. In the first column of Table 10 we regress this ratio on 
a dummy variable that indicates if the firm comes from the Trentino province (one) or the 
Austrian Tyrol province (zero) as our key explanatory variable. For this sample, we do not have 
information on the CEOs so we only include firm-specific controls, industry fixed effects, and 
controls for the end of the fiscal year. From the positive and strongly significant coefficient of 
the Headquarters in Trentino, we conclude that in the bordering areas of Trentino and Austrian 
Tyrol, Italian firms tend to hold relatively less equity than Austrian firms. Since these areas have 
not been exposed to the negative shocks that occurred in South Tyrol, these findings again 
support our interpretation that the leverage decision is not driven by province-specific risk 
aversion.18  
To conclude this section, we make use of the data from these neighboring provinces to 
emphasize the benefits of conducting the analysis in a multicultural environment within the same 
economic and institutional setting. In the second column of Table 10 we compare shareholder 
equity ratios in firms of Germanic origin in South Tyrol, Italian origin in South Tyrol and Italian 
origin in Trentino, using Germanic firms in Austrian Tyrol as our (omitted) base group. We 
observe that firms run by CEOs of Germanic origin have similar capitalization ratios both in 
South Tyrol and in Austrian Tyrol. Firms run by CEOs of Italian origin in Trentino instead have 
lower equity ratios than their cultural peers in South Tyrol. More interestingly, the difference in 
                                                          
18 A residual concern specific to South Tyrol may be linked to potentially different levels of wealth of firm managers 
of the two cultural groups. Given that most of our firms are small and owner-managed, the link between the firm and 
the CEO’s household raises the question if the firm’s financing decision should be studied in connection with the 
CEO’s wealth. Unfortunately, it is impossible to formally test this issue due to unavailability of data on the personal 
wealth of individuals in South Tyrol. 
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shareholder equity ratios between firms in Trentino and firms in Austrian Tyrol (which differ 
along both cultural and economic/institutional dimensions) is significantly different from the 
corresponding difference between Italian-speaking and German-speaking firms in South Tyrol 
(which differ only along the cultural dimension). This highlights the importance of focusing on 
an environment with a fixed regulatory, economic and institutional environment to study the 
cultural preferences for financing structure.  
 
6.  Overall Conclusions 
This paper examines the relation between the cultural origin of firm managers and corporate 
financing behavior. Motivated by the evidence from previous literature on the relationship 
between social capital and financial development, on individuals’ preferences for conducting 
economic activities within either formal institutions or informal networks, and on managerial 
style, we conjecture that the composition of firm liabilities can be shaped by culturally embedded 
preferences of their managers. Consistent with our conjecture, we find large and significant 
differences in the financing structure of firms run by individuals of different cultural origin. Our 
method, which analyzes firms within a small geographical province in one country, ensures that 
these results are not driven by institutional, regulatory, religious or economic differences 
associated with the different cultures. Lacking detailed bank-firm level data, we perform a series 
of robustness checks to further rule out that our results are driven by omitted variables and other 
endogeneity concerns. Throughout the different analyses, our results are consistent with the 
existence of culturally embedded preferences for different types of financing structures.  
For the benefit of internal validity and identification, we have set up our analysis in one 
particular province in Italy that hosts two different cultural groups. While the setting of our study 
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is highly specific, the results have, in general, a much wider external validity. In particular, the 
South Tyrol province has a level of GDP comparable to that of many advanced economies, and 
aligned with the average GDP of the European Union. Moreover, its residents are active in a 
wide range of sectors, from agriculture to manufacturing and services, and enjoy a high degree of 
industrialization. Thus, we believe that our results are informative on the effect of culture on the 
financing practices of firms in wider setups, particularly for advanced economies. 
Our main results highlight culture as one of the drivers of the variation in the recourse to 
financing in a multi-cultural setup. In terms of policy implications, our results suggest that one-
size-fits-all regulations aimed at incentivizing the access to formal sources of finance could have 
heterogeneous effects depending on the preferences of different cultural groups affected by the 
regulation. Similarly, our study suggests that financial education should be structured differently 
according to the preferences of the different target cultural groups.  
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
This table reports summary statistics for the cross section of sample firms headquartered in the South 
Tyrol province with a CEO of Italian or Germanic origin as of the latest available year prior to 2016. The 
origin of the CEO is determined as illustrated in Appendix A. Dependent and control variables are 
computed as explained in Appendix B.  
Variables N Mean Std p25 p50 p75 
CEO cultural origin: 
      CEO of Italian origin 3,526 0.311 0.463 0 0 1 
       
Dependent variables:       
External debt user 3,526 0.741 0.438 0 1 1 
External debt financing / Total assets 3,526 0.315 0.315 0 0.239 0.566 
Bank user 3,526 0.516 0.500 0 1 1 
Total debt / Total assets 3,526 0.161 0.232 0 0.001 0.281 
Cash / Total assets 3,416 0.109 0.164 0.004 0.031 0.146 
Trade credit user 3,526 0.734 0.442 0 1 1 
Accounts payable / Total assets 3,526 0.153 0.200 0 0.076 0.231 
Accounts receivable / Total assets 3,526 0.203 0.246 0 0.097 0.348 
       
Firm control variables:       
Firm size 3,526 13.75 1.818 12.56 13.75 14.95 
Asset tangibility 3,526 0.263 0.289 0.032 0.134 0.439 
Sales growth 3,526 0.045 0.585 -0.104 0.016 0.146 
Investment 3,526 0.039 0.080 0.004 0.016 0.047 
Operating margin 3,526 0.097 0.479 0.026 0.076 0.178 
Firm age 3,526 16.05 14.39 5 12 23 
Predicted trade credit supply 3,526 0.308 0.135 0.226 0.334 0.404 
Current assets 3,526 0.662 0.306 0.433 0.766 0.932 
       
CEO control variables:       
CEO age 3,526 52.71 11.54 45 52 60 
CEO is male 3,526 0.880 0.325 1 1 1 
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Table 2. T-tests for differences in mean values 
This table reports mean values, standard deviations and t-tests of differences in means (with associated p-
values) of dependent and control variables for the cross section of sample firms headquartered in the 
South Tyrol province with a CEO of Italian or Germanic origin as of the latest available year prior to 
2016. Firm controls refer to the last available balance sheet date in Orbis (as of March 2016). The origin 
of the CEO is determined as illustrated in Appendix A. Dependent and control variables are computed as 
explained in Appendix B. 
 CEO of Italian origin CEO of Germanic origin   
Variables Mean Std Mean Std t-test p-value 
Dependent variables:       
External debt user 0.770 0.421 0.728 0.445 2.703 0.007 
External debt financing / Total assets 0.334 0.312 0.307 0.316 2.371 0.018 
Bank user 0.542 0.498 0.505 0.500 2.005 0.045 
Total debt / Total assets 0.157 0.218 0.162 0.238 -0.656 0.512 
Cash / Total assets 0.121 0.177 0.104 0.158 2.797 0.005 
Trade credit user 0.764 0.425 0.720 0.449 2.803 0.005 
Accounts payable / Total assets 0.176 0.218 0.143 0.190 4.340 0.000 
Accounts receivable / Total assets 0.225 0.259 0.193 0.239 3.523 0.000 
       
Firm control variables:       
Firm size 13.31 1.936 13.95 1.727 -9.278 0.000 
Asset tangibility 0.227 0.274 0.279 0.294 -5.112 0.000 
Sales growth 0.028 0.672 0.052 0.542 -1.052 0.293 
Investment 0.037 0.081 0.040 0.080 -0.938 0.348 
Operating margin 0.064 0.545 0.111 0.445 -2.511 0.012 
Firm age 14.47 12.71 16.77 15.04 -4.688 0.000 
Supply of trade credit (predicted) 0.288 0.133 0.316 0.135 -5.765 0.000 
Current assets 0.692 0.295 0.648 0.310 4.032 0.000 
       
CEO control variables:       
CEO age 53.83 12.09 52.21 11.26 3.758 0.000 
CEO is male 0.842 0.365 0.898 0.303 -4.401 0.000 
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Table 3. Cultural origin OLS regressions 
This table reports OLS estimates for the cross section of sample firms headquartered in the South Tyrol province with a CEO of Italian or 
Germanic origin as of the latest available year prior to 2016. The origin of the CEO is determined as illustrated in Appendix A. Dependent 
and control variables are computed as explained in Appendix B. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity. ***, ** and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  





Bank user Total debt /  
Total assets 










CEO of Italian origin 0.055*** 0.033** 0.107*** 0.019** -0.003 0.055*** 0.015* 0.013 
 (0.017) (0.013) (0.020) (0.009) (0.007) (0.018) (0.009) (0.010) 
Firm size 0.048*** 0.022*** 0.080*** 0.020*** -0.023*** 0.047*** 0.003 0.005** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) 
Asset tangibility -0.028 0.040* 0.171*** 0.188*** -0.123*** -0.040 -0.150*** -0.259*** 
 (0.030) (0.022) (0.034) (0.018) (0.009) (0.030) (0.012) (0.012) 
Sales growth 0.019 0.014 0.026* -0.005 0.004 0.025* 0.019*** 0.015** 
 (0.013) (0.010) (0.014) (0.007) (0.005) (0.013) (0.007) (0.007) 
Investment 0.137 0.203*** 0.302*** 0.182*** -0.106*** 0.127 0.019 -0.199*** 
 (0.087) (0.074) (0.102) (0.054) (0.027) (0.090) (0.046) (0.038) 
Operating margin -0.027* -0.048*** -0.027 -0.021** 0.025*** -0.025 -0.024*** 0.009 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.019) (0.010) (0.005) (0.016) (0.008) (0.007) 
Firm age -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
CEO age 0.006 0.004 0.009** 0.002 0.001 0.006 0.002 0.007*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) 
CEO age squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CEO is male 0.019 0.008 0.011 0.017 0.009 0.020 -0.009 -0.006 
 (0.024) (0.016) (0.026) (0.011) (0.008) (0.024) (0.011) (0.013) 
Constant 0.269 0.375* -0.443** -0.032 0.421*** 0.260 0.396*** 0.105 
 (0.170) (0.211) (0.205) (0.141) (0.069) (0.171) (0.115) (0.095) 
Observations 3,526 3,526 3,526 3,526 3,416 3,526 3,526 3,526 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls for fiscal year end Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.063 0.057 0.115 0.115 0.138 0.060 0.092 0.139 
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Table 4. Local environment analysis 
This table reports estimates for the cross section of firms headquartered in the South Tyrol province with a CEO of Italian or Germanic 
origin as of the latest available year prior to 2016. The sample in panel A (B) [C] {D} is restricted to firms that are headquartered in cities 
where the population of Italian speakers is less than 30% (where the proportion of banks with a manager of Italian cultural origin is less than 
30%) [with no Italian-speaking bank managers] {Bolzano}. CEO of Italian origin is a dummy variable constructed as illustrated in Appendix 
A. All panels include industry fixed effects and control for firm size, asset tangibility, sales growth, investment, operating margin, age, CEO 
characteristics (age, age squared, gender), and fiscal year end. Panels A, B, C include city fixed effects. Dependent and control variables are 
defined in Appendix B. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 





External debt financing 
/ Total assets 





/ Total assets 
Accounts receivable 
/ Total assets 
Panel A: Cities with less than 30% Italian speaking population 
CEO of Italian origin 0.073*** 0.028 0.088** 0.012 0.067* 0.017 0.004 
 (0.035) (0.027) (0.038) (0.018) (0.035) (0.017) (0.019) 
Observations 1,673 1,673 1,673 1,673 1,673 1,673 1,673 
Proportion It. CEO obs. 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 
Adj. R-squared 0.084 0.055 0.128 0.111 0.076 0.100 0.149 
Panel B: Cities with less than 30% bank managers of Italian origin 
CEO of Italian origin 0.075** 0.044 0.090** 0.012 0.067* 0.033* 0.022 
 (0.036) (0.028) (0.040) (0.019) (0.037) (0.018) (0.021) 
Observations 1,499 1,499 1,499 1,499 1,499 1,499 1,499 
Proportion It. CEO obs. 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 
Adj. R-squared 0.140 0.069 0.142 0.101 0.091 0.117 0.158 
Panel C: Cities with no bank managers of Italian origin 
CEO of Italian origin 0.018 0.029 -0.014 -0.011 0.019 0.040 0.024 
 (0.047) (0.038) (0.049) (0.025) (0.047) (0.026) (0.026) 
Observations 1,014 1,014 1,014 1,014 1,014 1,014 1,014 
Proportion It. CEO obs. 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 
Adj. R-squared 0.134 0.079 0.167 0.153 0.121 0.126 0.167 
Panel D: City of Bolzano 
CEO of Italian origin 0.051** 0.035* 0.124*** 0.016 0.056** 0.018 0.028* 
 (0.024) (0.018) (0.028) (0.013) (0.024) (0.013) (0.015) 
Observations 1,292 1,292 1,292 1,292 1,292 1,292 1,292 
Proportion It. CEO obs. 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 
Adj. R-squared 0.034 0.061 0.098 0.083 0.036 0.092 0.116 
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Table 5. External financing during the financial and sovereign crisis 
This table reports estimates for the panel of firms headquartered in the South Tyrol province with a CEO of Italian or Germanic origin over the 
years 2006-2015. CEO of Italian origin is a dummy variable constructed as in Appendix A. Crisis (Post crisis) equals one for the years 2008-2013 
(2014-2015) and zero otherwise. The time-varying firm-level controls are firm size, asset tangibility, sales growth, investment, operating margin, 
age. CEO characteristics are age, age squared, gender. Dependent and control variables are defined in Appendix B. Standard errors are clustered at 
















receivable / Total 
assets 
Panel A: Estimations with industry fixed effects 
CEO of Italian origin 0.035** 0.031** 0.074*** 0.012 0.039** 0.017* 0.021* 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.022) (0.012) (0.016) (0.010) (0.012) 
CEO of Italian origin * Crisis 0.041*** 0.026** 0.049*** 0.026*** 0.037*** 0.002 0.006 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.018) (0.010) (0.014) (0.008) (0.009) 
CEO of Italian origin * Post crisis 0.014 0.005 0.020 0.008 0.010 -0.001 -0.013 
 (0.020) (0.016) (0.024) (0.012) (0.021) (0.011) (0.012) 
Observations 22,091 22,091 22,091 22,091 22,091 22,091 22,091 
Firm-level controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CEO characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE No No No No No No No 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.085 0.107 0.128 0.145 0.085 0.162 0.214 
Panel B: Estimations with firm fixed effects 
CEO of Italian origin * Crisis 0.045*** 0.020* 0.043** 0.024*** 0.042*** -0.003 0.018** 
 (0.013) (0.011) (0.017) (0.009) (0.014) (0.007) (0.007) 
CEO of Italian origin * Post crisis 0.032* 0.007 0.019 0.013 0.030 -0.004 0.010 
 (0.019) (0.014) (0.023) (0.011) (0.020) (0.009) (0.010) 
Observations 22,091 22,091 22,091 22,091 22,091 22,091 22,091 
Number of firms 3,526 3,526 3,526 3,526 3,526 3,526 3,526 
Firm-level controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CEO characteristics No No No No No No No 
Industry FE No No No No No No No 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City FE No No No No No No No 
Adj. R-squared 0.045 0.063 0.032 0.044 0.042 0.046 0.042 
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Table 6. Controlling for the supply of trade credit 
This table reports the second stage of a two-step estimation for trade credit usage for the cross section of 
sample firms headquartered in the South Tyrol province with a CEO of Italian or Germanic origin as of 
the latest available year prior to 2016. CEO of Italian origin is a dummy variable constructed as illustrated 
in Appendix A. Predicted trade credit supply are the fitted values of a first-stage regression model relating 
trade credit supply to the firm’s credit quality, the availability of bank credit, relationships with suppliers, 
liquidation costs and CEO’s cultural origin (see the text for details). Dependent and control variables are 
defined in Appendix B. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity. ***, ** and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
  Trade credit user Accounts payable / Total assets 
CEO of Italian origin 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.046*** 0.044*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.009) (0.009) 
Firm size 0.053*** 0.054*** 0.009*** 0.011*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) 
Asset tangibility 0.206*** 0.217*** 0.075*** 0.186*** 
 (0.058) (0.066) (0.029) (0.033) 
Sales growth -0.017 -0.017 -0.020** -0.016** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.008) (0.008) 
Investment 0.137 0.147 0.027 0.133*** 
 (0.091) (0.095) (0.046) (0.046) 
Operating margin 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.004 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.008) (0.008) 
Firm age -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
CEO age 0.006 0.006 0.002 0.002 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) 
CEO age squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CEO is male 0.022 0.022 -0.008 -0.006 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.011) (0.011) 
Predicted trade credit supply 0.679*** 0.674*** 0.622*** 0.577*** 
 (0.134) (0.135) (0.074) (0.074) 
Current assets  0.015  0.149*** 
  (0.046)  (0.022) 
Constant -0.108 -0.124 0.059 -0.095 
 (0.188) (0.193) (0.118) (0.120) 
Observations 3,526 3,526 3,526 3,526 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls for fiscal year end Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.064 0.064 0.109 0.122 
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Table 7. Subsample analysis 
This table reports estimates for the cross section of firms headquartered in the South Tyrol province with a CEO of Italian or Germanic 
origin as of the latest available year prior to 2016. The sample in panel A (B) [C] {D} is restricted to those family firms whose CEO is a 
family member (is restricted to firms with total assets of up to 2m euros) [excludes the upper quartile of importing firms] {excludes 
agriculture, forestry and fishing, manufacturing, education, human health and social work activities}. CEO of Italian origin is a dummy 
variable constructed as illustrated in Appendix A. All panels include industry fixed effects, city fixed effects and controls for firm size, asset 
tangibility, sales growth, investment, operating margin, age, CEO characteristics (age, age squared, gender), and fiscal year end. Dependent 
and control variables are defined in Appendix B. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity. ***, ** and * indicate statistical 





External debt financing 
/ Total assets 





/ Total assets 
Accounts receivable 
/ Total assets 
Panel A: Family firms 
CEO of Italian origin 0.043* 0.016 0.076*** 0.005 0.042* 0.011 0.011 
 (0.024) (0.018) (0.027) (0.013) (0.025) (0.011) (0.013) 
Observations 2,104 2,104 2,104 2,104 2,104 2,104 2,104 
Adj. R-squared 0.036 0.060 0.097 0.101 0.032 0.104 0.125 
Panel B: Micro firms 
CEO of Italian origin 0.064*** 0.031* 0.123*** 0.013 0.062*** 0.019* 0.021 
 (0.023) (0.016) (0.025) (0.011) (0.023) (0.011) (0.013) 
Observations 2,314 2,314 2,314 2,314 2,314 2,314 2,314 
Adj. R-squared 0.051 0.059 0.070 0.094 0.052 0.073 0.109 
Panel C: Excluding importing firms 
CEO of Italian origin 0.050** 0.036** 0.109*** 0.018* 0.047** 0.018* -0.003 
 (0.020) (0.015) (0.023) (0.011) (0.021) (0.010) (0.012) 
Observations 2,678 2,678 2,678 2,678 2,678 2,678 2,678 
Adj. R-squared 0.067 0.054 0.119 0.118 0.062 0.086 0.132 
Panel D: Excluding culturally homogeneous industries 
CEO of Italian origin 0.073*** 0.035** 0.118*** 0.017* 0.071*** 0.019** 0.018 
 (0.019) (0.014) (0.022) (0.010) (0.019) (0.010) (0.012) 
Observations 2,843 2,843 2,843 2,843 2,843 2,843 2,843 
Adj. R-squared 0.056 0.055 0.113 0.122 0.050 0.084 0.137 
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Table 8. Further controls for the local environment 
Panel A (B) reports estimates for the cross section of sample firms headquartered in the South Tyrol province with a CEO of Italian or Germanic 
origin as of the latest available year prior to 2016 after including city-industry fixed (city-industry-firm size) effects. Firm size––micro, small, 
medium, or large––follows the European Commission definitions. CEO of Italian origin is a dummy variable constructed as illustrated in 
Appendix A. All regressions include controls for firm size, asset tangibility, sales growth, investment, operating margin, age, CEO characteristics 
(age, age squared, gender), and fiscal year end. Dependent and control variables are defined in Appendix B. Standard errors are robust to 





External debt financing 
/ Total assets 





/ Total assets 
Accounts receivable / 
Total assets 
Panel A: City-industry fixed effects 
CEO of Italian origin 0.059*** 0.038*** 0.112*** 0.020** 0.059*** 0.018* 0.015 
 (0.019) (0.014) (0.022) (0.010) (0.020) (0.009) (0.012) 
Observations 3,526 3,526 3,526 3,526 3,526 3,526 3,526 
City-industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls for fiscal year end Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.059 0.065 0.111 0.148 0.057 0.065 0.097 
Panel B: City-industry-firm size fixed effects 
CEO of Italian origin 0.053** 0.039** 0.122*** 0.021** 0.054** 0.018* 0.017 
 (0.022) (0.016) (0.025) (0.011) (0.022) (0.011) (0.013) 
Observations 3,526 3,526 3,526 3,526 3,526 3,526 3,526 
City-industry-firm size FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls for fiscal year end Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.050 0.068 0.106 0.170 0.046 0.019 0.068 
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Table 9. Capital structure in neighboring provinces: Summary statistics 
This table reports summary statistics for the ratio of shareholders equity over total assets in the cross section of 
sample firms headquartered in South Tyrol, Austrian Tyrol and Trentino for the last available year prior to 2016.  
 
N Mean Std p25 p50 p75 
Overall 7,946 0.312 0.255 0.096 0.248 0.481 
South Tyrol  3,528 0.299 0.264 0.070 0.227 0.474 
Austrian Tyrol 373 0.408 0.235 0.221 0.390 0.577 
Trentino 4,045 0.316 0.247 0.108 0.254 0.477 
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Table 10. Capital structure in neighboring provinces: OLS estimates  
The first (second) column reports estimates for the cross section of sample firms headquartered in Austrian Tyrol 
and Trentino (South Tyrol, Austrian Tyrol and Trentino) for the last available year prior to 2016 with respect to 
the ratio of shareholders equity over total assets. Headquarters in Trentino is a dummy variable indicating if the 
firm comes from Trentino. Headquarters in Austrian Tyrol is an omitted dummy variable indicating if the firm 
comes from Austrian Tyrol. CEO of Germanic origin in South Tyrol and CEO of Italian origin in South Tyrol 
are dummy variables for the cultural origin of the CEOs in South Tyrol. These two variables take their values 
from the CEO of Italian origin variable. All other control variables and the dependent variables are computed as 
explained in Appendix B. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity. ***, ** and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Equity / Total assets 
Headquarters in Trentino (1) -0.073*** -0.065*** 
 (0.015) (0.014) 
CEO of Germanic origin in South Tyrol (2)  0.019 
  (0.017) 
CEO of Italian origin in South Tyrol (3)  -0.016 
  (0.018) 
Headquarters in Austrian Tyrol (4) Omitted Omitted 
   
Firm size -0.012*** -0.011*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) 
Asset tangibility 0.064*** 0.043*** 
 (0.016) (0.012) 
Sales growth -0.042*** -0.034*** 
 (0.008) (0.006) 
Investment -0.058 -0.029 
 (0.055) (0.043) 
Operating margin 0.191*** 0.193*** 
 (0.025) (0.017) 
Firm age 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.320*** 0.354*** 
 (0.030) (0.080) 
Observations 4,418 7,946 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Controls for fiscal year end Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.096 0.109 
F-test: 1 = 3  8.74*** 
F-test: 3 = 2  14.51*** 
F-test: (1 – 4) = (3 – 2)   4.51** 
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Figure 1. Cultural origin of cities in South Tyrol 
This figure shows the distribution (quartiles) of Italian-speaking population by city as reported by the 2011 
Census (ASTAT, 2015). 
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Figure 2. Cultural origin of CEOs in South Tyrol 
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Figure 3. Cultural origin of bank managers in South Tyrol 
This figure shows the proportion of banks where the manager is of Italian origin by city. 
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Figure 4. Cultural origin within industries 
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Appendix A. Manager classification 
We classify a CEO as of Italian origin if all his/her given names and surname are Italian. We classify a CEO as 
of Germanic origin if all his/her given names and surname are Germanic. If the given name is common to both 
Italian and Germanic languages, we classify the CEO origin based on the surname. Foreign CEOs and CEOs 
with discordant given names and surname are excluded. The following are some examples of CEO classification. 
Name and surname Criteria Classification 
Claudio La Spisa Italian given name and surname Italian 
Georg Koessler Germanic given name and surname Germanic 
Marco Fuchs Italian or Germanic given name; Germanic surname Germanic 
Marco Iori Italian or Germanic given name; Italian surname Italian 
Paolo Stocker Italian given name; Germanic surname Excluded 
Guenther Longo Germanic given name; Italian surname Excluded 
Youjun Luan Foreign given name and surname Excluded 
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Appendix B. Variable definitions 
Variable Calculation Source 
CEO of Italian origin Dummy=1(=0) if manager is of Italian 
(Germanic) origin 
Lists of Italian and German/Austrian most 
common names and surnames. Telephone 
directories  
External debt user Dummy=1 if (Loans + long term debt + 
creditors) > 0 
Orbis BvD 
External debt financing / Total 
assets 
(Loans + long term debt + creditors) / 
Total assets  
Orbis BvD 
Ln(External debt financing) Ln(Loans + long term debt + creditors)  Orbis BvD 
Bank user Dummy=1 if (Loans + long term debt) > 
0 
Orbis BvD 
Ln(Employment) Ln(Number of employees) Orbis BvD 
Total debt /  
Total assets 
(Loans + long term debt) / Total assets Orbis BvD 
Ln(Total debt) Ln(Loans + long term debt) Orbis BvD 
Trade credit user Dummy=1 if Creditors > 0 Orbis BvD 
Accounts payable / Total assets Creditors / Total assets Orbis BvD 
Accounts receivable / Total assets Debtors / Total assets Orbis BvD 
Cash / Total assets Cash and cash equivalent / Total assets Orbis BvD 
Equity / Total assets Shareholders funds / Total assets Orbis BvD 
Firm size Ln(total assets) Orbis BvD 
Asset tangibility Tangible fixed assets / Total assets Orbis BvD 
Sales growth  Ln(sales) – ln(sales)-1  Orbis BvD 
Investment (Tangible fixed assets – tangible fixed 
assets-1 + depreciation) / Total assets 
Orbis BvD 
Operating margin Ebitda / Sales Orbis BvD 
Predicted trade credit supply ((Cost of raw materials + cost of services) 
/ Total assets) * (Supplying industries’ 
average accounts receivable / Total sales) 
Orbis Aida BvD, ASTAT, ISTAT  
Current assets (Stocks + debtors + other current assets) / 
Total assets 
Orbis BvD 
Firm age Firm age in years Orbis BvD 
CEO age CEO age in years Orbis BvD 
CEO is male Dummy=1 if CEO is male Orbis BvD 
Headquarters in Trentino Dummy=1 if the headquarters are in 
Trentino 
Orbis BvD 
Headquarters in Austrian Tyrol Omitted dummy=1 if the headquarters are 
in Austrian Tyrol 
Orbis BvD 
Proportion It. CEO obs. CEO of Italian origin / observations Authors’ calculations  
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Appendix C. Cultural origin of the Board of Directors  
This table reports estimates for the cross section of firms headquartered in the South Tyrol province with a board of directors of Italian or 
Germanic origin as of the latest available year prior to 2016. BoD of Italian origin is a dummy variable equal to one (zero) if the majority of the 
members of the Board of Directors is of Italian (Germanic) origin. Dependent and control variables are computed as explained in Appendix B. 
Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  





Bank user Total debt /  
Total assets 










BoD of Italian origin 0.063*** 0.039*** 0.116*** 0.024** -0.004 0.063*** 0.016* 0.016 
 (0.018) (0.014) (0.021) (0.009) (0.007) (0.019) (0.009) (0.011) 
Firm size 0.049*** 0.022*** 0.082*** 0.021*** -0.023*** 0.049*** 0.002 0.005* 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) 
Asset tangibility -0.018 0.044* 0.169*** 0.186*** -0.126*** -0.028 -0.144*** -0.255*** 
 (0.031) (0.023) (0.035) (0.018) (0.009) (0.031) (0.012) (0.013) 
Sales growth 0.020 0.014 0.028* -0.006 0.003 0.027** 0.020*** 0.016** 
 (0.013) (0.010) (0.015) (0.007) (0.005) (0.014) (0.007) (0.007) 
Investment 0.170* 0.230*** 0.362*** 0.203*** -0.101*** 0.178* 0.026 -0.174*** 
 (0.091) (0.076) (0.106) (0.055) (0.029) (0.093) (0.048) (0.040) 
Operating margin -0.035** -0.055*** -0.037* -0.024** 0.025*** -0.033** -0.028*** 0.005 
 (0.016) (0.014) (0.019) (0.011) (0.005) (0.017) (0.008) (0.007) 
Firm age -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.001*** 0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
CEO age 0.008* 0.004 0.012** 0.002 0.001 0.008 0.002 0.007*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) 
CEO age squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CEO is male 0.021 0.002 -0.001 0.016 0.012 0.023 -0.014 -0.011 
 (0.025) (0.017) (0.026) (0.012) (0.008) (0.025) (0.011) (0.014) 
Constant 0.194 0.378* -0.482** -0.048 0.427*** 0.183 0.415*** 0.096 
 (0.177) (0.217) (0.210) (0.145) (0.071) (0.178) (0.119) (0.097) 
Observations 3,333 3,333 3,333 3,333 3,224 3,333 3,333 3,333 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls for fiscal year end Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.063 0.057 0.117 0.115 0.138 0.061 0.091 0.135 
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Appendix D. Firm size, debt, and investment in labour during the financial and sovereign crisis 
This table reports estimates for the panel of firms headquartered in the South Tyrol province with a CEO 
of Italian or Germanic origin over the years 2006-2015. CEO of Italian origin is a dummy variable 
constructed as in Appendix A in the manuscript. Crisis (Post crisis) equals one for the years 2008-2013 
(2014-2015) and zero otherwise. Dependent variables are defined in Appendix B. Standard errors are 
clustered at the firm level. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 Firm size Ln(External debt 
financing) 
Ln(Total debt) Ln(Employment) 
CEO of Italian origin * Crisis -0.024 0.540*** 0.486** -0.008 
 (0.023) (0.167) (0.215) (0.036) 
CEO of Italian origin * Post crisis -0.014 0.345 0.176 -0.028 
 (0.032) (0.240) (0.290) (0.045) 
Constant 13.830*** 11.328*** 8.433*** 2.000*** 
 (0.011) (0.086) (0.109) (0.015) 
Observations 22,091 22,079 22,075 15,907 
Number of firms 3,526 3,526 3,526 2,985 
Firm-level controls No No No No 
CEO characteristics No No No No 
Industry FE No No No No 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City FE No No No No 
Adj. R-squared 0.067 0.046 0.028 0.039 
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Appendix E. Investment and operating margin during the financial and sovereign crisis 
This table reports estimates for the panel of firms headquartered in the South Tyrol province with a CEO 
of Italian or Germanic origin over the years 2006-2015. CEO of Italian origin is a dummy variable 
constructed as in Appendix A. Crisis (Post crisis) equals one for the years 2008-2013 (2014-2015) and 
zero otherwise. Firm-level controls are firm size and age. CEO characteristics are age, age squared, 
gender. Dependent and control variables are defined in Appendix B. Standard errors are clustered at the 
firm level. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  
Investment Operating margin 
Panel A: Estimations with industry fixed effects 
CEO of Italian origin -0.009** 0.017 
 (0.004) (0.011) 
CEO of Italian origin * Crisis 0.007* -0.002 
 (0.004) (0.010) 
CEO of Italian origin * Post crisis 0.007 -0.017 
 (0.005) (0.015) 
Observations 22,091 22,091 
Firm-level controls  Yes Yes 
CEO characteristics Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Firm FE No No 
Year FE Yes Yes 
City FE Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.039 0.046 
Panel B: Estimations with firm fixed effects 
CEO of Italian origin * Crisis 0.004 -0.007 
 (0.004) (0.009) 
CEO of Italian origin * Post crisis 0.005 -0.018 
 (0.005) (0.014) 
Observations 22,091 22,091 
Number of firms 3,526 3,526 
Firm-level controls  Yes Yes 
CEO characteristics No No 
Industry FE No No 
Firm FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
City FE No No 
Adj. R-squared 0.064 0.003 
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Appendix F. Matching by size, industry, and city 
This table reports estimates for the cross section of sample firms headquartered in the South Tyrol province with a CEO of Italian or Germanic 
origin as of the latest available year prior to 2016. Each firms led by a CEO of Italian origin is matched with a firm led by a CEO of Germanic 
origin of the same size, industry and city. Firm size––micro, small, medium, or large––follows the European Commission definitions. CEO of 
Italian origin is a dummy variable constructed as illustrated in Appendix A. All regressions include controls for firm size, asset tangibility, sales 
growth, investment, operating margin, age, CEO characteristics (age, age squared, gender), and fiscal year end. Dependent and control variables 
are defined in Appendix B. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 





External debt financing 
/ Total assets 





/ Total assets 
Accounts receivable 
/ Total assets 
CEO of Italian origin 0.060*** 0.040*** 0.123*** 0.023** 0.059*** 0.017* 0.018 
 (0.019) (0.014) (0.021) (0.009) (0.019) (0.009) (0.011) 
Observations 2,375 2,375 2,375 2,375 2,375 2,375 2,375 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls for fiscal year end Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.036 0.061 0.104 0.117 0.035 0.081 0.117 
 
